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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE A. JACOBSON and 
REGINA J. JACOBSON, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants , 
-vs-
CLYDE E. JACOBSON and 
ERMA B. JACOBSON, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 39,647 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated in 1974 for the 
purpose of canceling a void deed constituting a cloud on 
title to real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The dispute was tried before the Honorable George 
E. Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, sitting without a jury. The court made findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for 
Respondents, the defendants below. The court found that 
the deed to the disputed property vested full legal title 
in the Respondents, free and clear of any and all claims 
in favor of the Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial 
court overruled. Appellants ask this Court to declare that 
full legal title to the disputed property is vested in 
them and to enter judgment in their favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 28, 1962, Appellants Clyde E. Jacob-
son and Regina Jacobson purchased the property in dispute, 
approximately twelve acres of land located in Utah County. 
Sellers were Norval and Alice Carter, and the sale was 
made under a Uniform Real Estate Contractf (Tr. 11, 
Exhibit P-3) at a purchase price of $14,538.10. Appel-
lants made an initial downpayment of $809.91. (Tr. 11). 
After repairing the house on that property to make it 
habitable, Jacobson and his family occupied the premises. 
Appellants made monthly payments of $100.00 
under the terms of the contract until early 1965 at which 
time their payments for the property became delinquent 
(Tr. 99). The seller instituted foreclosure proceedings 
in May of 1965. Pursuant to an order issued by the court 
Appellants were allowed until June 8, 1965 to pay off the 
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balance of their indebtedness to the sellers or a 
judgment of foreclosure would issue. (Tr. 16). 
In order to obtain enough money to pay the 
balance owing, Jacobson approached one Earl Stubbs of 
Provo, Utah. Stubbs agreed to lend him the sum of 
$10,000.00 but was unable to advance the entire amount 
due, $14,538.10 (Tr. 18). The remainder was raised by 
the Appelantfs father, Respondent Clyde E. Jacobson, 
(hereinafter referred to as Jacobson senior). 
On June 8, 1965, the last day that payment 
could be made, Stubbs and both Jacobsons met in the 
office of the seller's attorney, Heber Grant Ivans. 
They made an agreement whereby Stubbs advanced $10,000.00 
for payment of the obligation to the seller and Jacob-
son senior advanced $4,538.10. (Tr. 101, Exhibit P-5). 
Stubbs was concerned about securing his loan 
to Jacobson. The parties did not wish to have title to 
the property remain in Jacobsonfs name, however, since 
it would become subject to a prior judgment. It was 
agreed that the loan could not be secured by mortgaging 
the property (Tr. 104). 
As an alternative to a formal mortgage, the 
Appellant executed an "Open Warranty Deed" to Stubbs 
as security for his loan. A warranty deed signed by 
Jacobson with the names of grantees and grantors left 
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blank was sent to Stubbs by Ivans who handled the trans-
action (Tr. 105, Exhibit P-8). The blank deed given 
to Stubbs was intended and understood by the parties 
to create a security interest and not to accomplish a 
conveyance of the property. 
It is questionable whether Regina Jacobson 
signed the deed at the time it was delivered to Stubbs. 
She admits signing it eventually, but maintains that she 
did so unknowingly. (Tr. 81). The property description 
was very likely absent from the deed at this time also. 
(Tr. 22, 107). Jacobson never saw the deed again unless 
when signed by his wife. 
The warranty deed that was sent to Stubbs is 
the deed under which Respondents claim legal title to. 
the disputed property. 
Approximately a year after he signed the "open 
deed" the Appellant learned that his father had paid off 
the balance of his debt to Stubbs. (Tr. 38). The blank 
deed as well as the warranty deed to Jacobson from the 
seller were recorded on July 18, 1966. Respondents 
names were filled in as grantees in the blank deed. 
(Exhibits P-8, P-6) . The original of the record was to 
be sent to Jacobson senior. Neither Appellants knew 
who recorded the deed nor did they authorize the re-
cording. (Tr. 38, 84). 
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Appellants continued to occupy the disputed 
property throughout these events, leaving and returning 
at will. Jacobson left twice due to marital problems 
and Regina left once when a divorce was contemplated. 
Jacobson's sister and her husband lived there during 
that brief period (Tr. 50). 
At no time after its purchase did Appellants 
transfer the property to anyone or intend a conveyance 
by any transaction. 
POINT I. 
WHERE THE PROCEEDING TO BE REVIEWED 
IS IN EQUITY IT IS THE DUTY AND 
PREROGATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
TO REVIEW BOTH LAW AND FACTS AND 
TO CONSIDER THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE 
Since the present action is in equity, this 
Court has the authority and the responsibility to review 
the trial courtfs findings of fact as well as its con-
clusions of law. In' Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d. 
356, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (1966), an action to enforce 
an easement by proscription it was noted that: 
" * * * this attempt to assert and 
establish an interest in land, the 
legal title to which is vested in 
another is a proceeding in equity. 
It is the duty and prerogative of 
this court to review both the law 
and the facts, and to consider the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence." 
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The standard of review of an action in equity 
is more advantageous to an appellant than in other 
cases. The Supreme Court is entitled to make its own 
findings and substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1974). 
In Pogano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 
1975), an action to impose a trust on a joint bank 
account, this Court pointed out that even in equity 
cases a trial court's findings are viewed " with con-
siderable indulgence". But they will be overruled if 
the evidence "clearly preponderates against them". 
In this action Appellants contest the trial 
courtfs findings of fact as well as conclusions of 
law based upon them. If the weight of the evidence is 
against the trial court's judgment they are entitled 
to have it overruled. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS ESTABLISHED WITH CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING PROOF THAT THE DEED THEY SIGNED 
DID NOT ACT AS A PROPERTY CONVEYANCE 
A. INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PROVED THAT THE 
APPELLANTS DID NOT INTEND THE DEED TO 
BE A CONVEYANCE AND THAT THE GRANTEES 
WERE LEFT BLANK WHEN DELIVERED. 
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It was the undisputed testimony of both 
Appellants and the attorney who arranged the trans-
action that the deed by which Respondents assert 
ownership was intended to operate as a security 
interest only and not a property conveyance. 
It is undisputed that the Appellants pur-
chased the property in question in 1962 and that the 
only deed which Jacobson signed subsequent to his 
purchase was executed in Grant Ivans1 office on June 
8, 1965. It was Jacobsonfs testimony that the deed 
he signed contained no property description and that 
spaces for the names of grantors and grantees were 
left blank. The deed was sent to Earl Stubbs as 
security for a loan of $10,000.00 according to Jacob-
son's testimony, and was not intended as a conveyance 
of his property. 
"Q. (By Mr. Randle) Did you intend to 
sell your property to Mr. Stubbs? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you to pay him back? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 27-28). 
Regina Jacobson1s signature also appears on 
the deed under which Respondents claim their interest in 
the property. It was her testimony that, although her 
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signature appears on the document, she signed it with-
out knowing what it was, and never intended to convey 
her interest. 
11Q. When you signed that document, did 
you know it was a warranty deed? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Have you ever entered into a trans-
action where you intended to transfer 
that property to anyone? 
A. Never." (Tr. 82) . 
In addition to the Appellants themselves, Heber 
Grant Ivans, the attorney who arranged the transaction 
appeared on their behalf. Ivans testified that the loan 
made by Stubbs to Jacobson was not secured by a formal 
mortgage because an outstanding judgment made it un-
wise to leave title in Jacobson himself. (Tr. 107). 
It was Ivans who mailed the warranty deed to Stubbs 
which left the grantors and grantees blank. (Tr. 10 7). 
It was his understanding and his testimony that the 
deed was a security and was not intended as a property 
conveyance. 
11Q. Now, was the form of the trans-
action you structured, the form 
of a loan, and is that what the 
intention was to be, or was it 
a conveyance? I mean, is the 
basic structure other than the 
documents themselves, which of 
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course purport to be a con-
veyance, was it meant to be a 
conveyance? Or was it meant to 
be a loan and a security agree-
ment? 
A. Well, all I would say is that it 
was my recollection that Mr. Stubbs 
had loaned this money to assist 
Clyde A. Jacobson and his wife be-
cause he felt sorry for the boy 
and his wife. (Tr. Ill). 
* * * 
A. * * * In my opinion, the deeding 
transaction, as far as Mr. Stubbs 
was concerned, was for security 
purposes." (Tr. 113). 
During his testimony Ivans identified letters 
sent from him to the sellers and to Stubbsalong with 
copies of the deed. In the letter to Mr. and Mrs. 
Carter, the sellers, he states: 
"I am enclosing a Warranty Deed with the 
Grantee left blank . . . " (Exhibit P-19) 
In his letter to Stubbs, Ivans notes that: 
" I am also enclosing a Warranty Deed 
signed by the Jacobsons made in 
blank. . ." (Exhibit P-2 0). 
The Respondent introduced no evidence whatso-
ever which contradicted Appellant's proof that the 
warranty deed was not intended as a property conveyance 
and did not name the grantors and grantees when delivered. 
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Jacobson did admit on direct examination that 
in 1969 he filed bankruptcy in Federal Court where 
he testified that he had no ownership interest in the 
disputed property. (Tr. 46). He admitted that his 
testimony in that action contradicted his assertions 
in the present action and said that he had given false 
testimony in order to protect his land, (Tr. 62). 
Respondents offered the "Discharge of Bankrupt" in 
evidence. (Exhibit D-9) . 
Regina Jacobson acknowledged on direct ex-
amination that she had filed for divorce against her 
husband in 1973 and that the land in question is not 
listed among her holdings in pleadings filed. She 
testified, however, that the omission was an oversight 
of her counsel and that she had consistently requested 
to him that she did have such an interest. Her 
attorney appeared and testified that she had asserted 
her interest in the property to him. (Tr. 122). 
The file in Mrs. Jacobsonfs divorce action wais intro-
duced by the Respondents. (Exhibit D-12). 
Although this evidence might suggest that on 
a particular occasion both Appellants disclaimed 
ownership in the disputed property, when viewed in 
relation to their circumstances no such inference is 
justified by those statements. 
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More importantly, these facts do not affect 
or alter in anyway the Appellants uncontroverted proof 
that the deed which they signed was not intended by 
them as a property conveyance and was not filled in 
when delivered. Nor did Respondents1 introduction 
of evidence that the deed was eventually recorded in 
the Respondents1 names and that title insurance was 
issued to them address the crucial issues of fact. 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW A DEED WHICH WAS 
NOT INTENDED AS A PROPERTY CONVEYANCE 
AND DID NOT CONTAIN THE NAMES OF THE 
GRANTEE IS NOT A CONVEYANCE. 
From time immemorial, the common law has been 
that a transfer of property cannot take place unless 
the grantors intend it. As this Court stated in 
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d. 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 
(1960), no conveyance takes place until there is "an 
actual delivery with intent to transfer ownership." 
Often an instrument which purports to be a 
conveyance is intended to be the delivery of a 
security interest and not a property transfer. Where 
that is the case, the parties are allowed to prove 
their real intention and the courts will construe 
the instrument accordingly. 
In Bybee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 
118 (1948), the parties to a warranty deed executed a 
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contemporaneous agreement which established that the 
deed was intended as security only. The Supreme Court 
held that where a written agreement shows an intention 
to create a security interest and not a conveyance 
the transaction will be treated as a mortgage. 
However, proof of the parties1 intention 
in drafting a warranty deed need not be in writing. 
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), an 
action brought by a purchaser of property to contest 
ownership of a particular tract, this Court re-
affirmed its consistent holding to that effect. Re-
ferring to the Parole Evidence Rule it was noted 
that: 
"In more specific application here, 
when the conveyance (or part of it) 
was made only for the purpose of 
security rather than as an outright 
conveyance, that fact may be shown.,,f 
The instrument mailed to Stubbs had no legal 
effect as a conveyance, not only because the parties 
never intended that the property be sold but because 
the names of the grantees were omitted from it. In 
Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96, 97 (1949) 
a quiet title action, the Court explained that: 
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"A paper purporting to be a 
deed, but which is blank as to the 
grantee is no deed and is ineffec-
tive as a conveyance while the blank 
remains. 
. . . Also, if the name of the grantee 
is inserted by a party who never legally 
obtained possession of the instrument 
nor obtained authority from the grantor 
to complete the instrument, no deed 
comes into existence," 
The grantors did not intend the deed by which 
Respondents claim their interest to be a conveyance. 
When mailed, the space for the names of the grantees 
was left blank. The grantors at no time authorized 
the completion of the deed with Respondents names 
inserted as grantees. As a matter of law, that 
instrument could not transfer the disputed property 
from Appellants to Stubbs. 
Since Stubbs received only a security in-
terest he could not convey a property interest to 
the Respondents. Regardless of the belief under which 
Jacobson senior may have acted in paying the balance 
which Appellant owed Stubbs he received no interest 
in the disputed property because the only deed ever 
signed by its owner as a matter of law was not a con-
veyance . 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE OF THE 
FORMAL REQUISITES OF A MORTGAGE 
WAS INTRODUCED THE DEED MUST BE 
TREATED AS A CONVEYANCE 
The trial court held that inasmuch as no 
evidence of interest rate, terms of repayment and 
other requirements of an enforceable mortgage was 
introduced, the deed could not be treated as a 
mortgage. The trial court misconstrued the law 
which looks to the intention of the parties and not 
the requisites of a formal mortgage to determine how 
a warranty deed should be construed. 
In Bybee, supra 189 P.2d at 122, the Court 
pointed out that, to be treated as a mortgage: 
"No particular form is necessary so 
long as the intention of the parties 
is shown * * * * * a deed absolute 
on its face may be shown by parole 
evidence to have been given for 
security purposes only and when 
such a showing has been made, equity 
will give effect to the intention of 
the parties. Such security trans-
actions, lacking the requisites of 
a formal mortgage are termed equi-
table mortgages." 
It has never been suggested by this Court that 
the rate of interest and terms of repayment must be 
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established in order to treat a warranty deed as a 
mortgage. In the recent Kesler case, supra, for 
example, such evidence was lacking. The Court treated 
the deed as a mortgage simply because parole evidence 
established that it was intended as a security agree-
ment. No other showing has ever been required. 
It should be noted that in this instance 
Appellants offered proof of the terms of the security 
arrangement with Stubbs through the testimony of 
Jacobson himself. That evidence was excluded by the 
trial court as hearsay, over counsel's objection that 
the terms of a contract are verbal acts and not hear-
say. (Tr. 26). Stubbs was unable to testify himself 
due to illness. Appellants specifically claim this 
exclusion of evidence as error by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The only deed to the disputed property signed 
by its owners, Appellants Clyde E. and Regina Jacob-
son, was a blank deed intended as security for a loan. 
As a matter of law, this deed did not act as a convey-
ance of their property to Earl Stubbs. Stubbs in turn 
was incapable of conveying their property to Respondents 
who claim title under that deed. Appellants never 
conveyed their interest in the disputed property to 
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Respondents or to anyone else. For these reasons, 
Appellants ask this Court to declare that full legal 
title to the disputed property is vested in them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
[CHT 
RANDLE 
807 East South Temple 
Suite #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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